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The European Politics of Brain Drain: A Fast or Slow-Burning Crisis?1
Jacob A. Hasselbalch
Abstract
This qualitative multi-method study maps the politics of brain drain at the level of the European
Union and follows the evolution of the issue over the last four parliamentary periods. By
utilizing a novel combination of interviews with a content and network analysis of
parliamentary questions, the article demonstrates how the politics of brain drain travel from
the domestic level to the European through frames that connect the issue to problems and
solutions at the Union-level. After presenting a statistical overview of intra-EU mobility flows,
I conclude that the politics of brain drain are not adequately captured or addressed in the
official numbers. Instead, I turn to discourse in order to analyze the prevailing interpretations
of brain drain, why it occurs, and what to do about it. The analysis reveals that the uncertainty,
controversy, and open-endedness of brain drain as an intra-European phenomenon lends
itself well to multiple framings by actors in pursuit of preconceived political ends. This creates
a space of opportunities within the Commission between laissez-faire and interventionist
responses that vary in terms of the economic assumptions and political preferences brought
to bear on the issue. Although the current balance is weighted in favor of a supply-side,
employability logic towards brain drain, there is evidence of a schism within the Commission
that presents an opportunity to productively engage with other understandings of the issue in
pursuit of best practices.
Keywords: brain drain, European Union, labor mobility, parliamentary questions, skills,
migration
1 This working paper was funded by the European Commission Horizon 2020 project on ‘European Legitimacy
in Governing through Hard Times: The Role of European Networks (ENLIGHTEN)’. Project grant number:
649456-ENLIGHTEN. For more details, see: http://enlightenproject.eu. Jacob A. Hasselbalch is a postdoctoral
researcher at the Department of Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark. Email:
jaha.dbp@cbs.dk. ORCID ID: orcid.org/0000-0001-5491-7023.
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Introduction
Most discussions about brain drain in the context of the European Union (EU) concern the
drain of skilled labor from other countries to the EU or from the EU to other countries – brains
entering and exiting Europe, in other words. Formally speaking, brain drain cannot occur
within the Single Market (that is, from one EU country to another), because the Single Market,
by definition (if not entirely yet by design) draws on a common pool of labor shared by all
Member States. The free movement of workers, enshrined in EU law, is one of the four
freedoms enjoyed by all EU citizens. An internal market with a mobile workforce cannot, in
principle, experience brain drain.
In the foreword to a report on European brain drain versus brain gain, this founding myth
of European labor mobility is presented thus (Schellinger, 2015):
In the European Union there is a tale and it goes like this: In some member states the
economy is on the upswing and unemployment is low, in others the economy is in a
downturn and unemployment is high. As the European Union guarantees free
movement for persons, labor market mobility provides for the necessary adjustment. If
there are no jobs in one country, workers will relocate to another with better employment
prospects. Once their ‘home economy’ is on the upbeat trend again, they will return and
– bring with them the experiences acquired abroad. The functioning of the Eurozone is
ensured, national economies benefit, and people are in work. And everyone lives happily
ever after.
Labor mobility is sold as a win-win deal for Member States, based on an understanding of
classical economic theory that sees labor migration as unambiguously good (Galgóczi,
Leschke and Watt, 2009, p. 12). When labor is free to migrate, it seeks its highest reward,
raising both the welfare of migrant workers and welfare in the aggregate. But political realities
often get in the way of this narrative. Even if we discount political realities, a more
sophisticated economic analysis would remain sensitive to a number of intervening factors
that play a part in determining where migratory outcomes fall between the extremes of best-
case and worst-case scenarios (Galgóczi, Leschke and Watt, 2009, p. 13):
 Best-case scenario: A worker leaves a country where his skills are in excess supply and
takes up work appropriate to those skills at a higher wage in a country with excess demand
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in that area, remits a proportion of the income, and subsequently returns to the source
country with higher skills and productivity to a higher-paying job.
 Worst-case scenario: Young employed workers with critical skills but low wages leave to
take up unskilled – but higher-paying – work in high-unemployment, high-wage
economies, adding to pressure on already disadvantaged groups while suffering skill
erosion themselves.
The academic literature on brain drain developed in the context of studies on global
economic imbalances between developing and developed countries – brain drain designates
the international transfer of human capital in the form of long-term migration of highly-skilled
individuals from less-developed countries to more-developed ones (Beine, Docquier and
Rapoport, 2008). This reflects a tendency for human capital to agglomerate where it is already
abundant in what some have called a ‘global race for talent’, which is also playing out within
the boundaries of the European Union (Münz, 2014). The politics of intra-EU labor mobility
require a delicate balancing act between fostering more movement between countries while
ensuring fair outcomes for all. Fair outcomes would entail seeing more of the best-case
scenarios and less of the worst-case ones.
There are distributional effects and externalities, both positive and negative, that mediate
migratory outcomes between the extremes of best and worst-case scenarios (Galgóczi,
Leschke and Watt, 2009, p. 12). Regarding distributional effects, workers in receiving
countries will find themselves in direct competition with immigrant labor, while employers of
immigrant labor will benefit. This picture is reversed in sending countries, where remaining
workers will benefit and employers lose out. Regarding externalities, some examples include
the loss of returns on public investment in education, labor shortages in critical sectors, and
brain drain in sending countries. In the receiving countries, pressure on the disadvantaged
increases and working conditions may be undermined, exacerbating trends towards
inequality. Because of these externalities and distributional effects – in the face of EU law that
makes restricting flows difficult or illegal – immigration is often one of the most contentious
areas of domestic political debate in EU countries (Schmidt, 2017).
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The complexity of factors that impact on the success of EU-internal labor mobility means
that different migratory outcomes co-exist side-by-side and surely span the entire spectrum
from best to worst cases. The statistical picture (which I turn to in more detail in the next
section) gives no clear conclusion as to the balance between the two. We are, however, left
with a clear sense that there are two different kinds of brain drain playing out within the Single
Market: a slower-moving, long-term flow of Eastern workers draining West, and a faster-
moving, short-term flow of Southern workers draining North. The Eastern drain is caused
primarily by differences in wages and working conditions – the Southern drain by the financial
crisis and austerity politics. The different forms of brain drain coupled with the uncertain
statistical picture has provided a degree of freedom for politicians and interest groups to
variously emphasize the benefits or drawbacks of European labor mobility in pursuit of
preconceived political ends. A key question is whether brain drain is framed as a fast-burning
or slow-burning crisis, and what forms of knowledge and responses each of these
conceptualizations call for (Tsingou, 2014; Seabrooke & Tsingou, 2016, 2017)?
To challenge the fundamental freedom of labor mobility is to run completely against the
grain of what counts as acceptable and legitimate political discourse at the EU-level and to
expose yourself to charges of nationalism and populism. The legal and institutional setup of
the Single Market makes it entirely unsurprising that brain drain is a taboo issue among EU
policymakers. Yet, some EU Member States are increasingly voicing their concerns over brain
drain, also at the European level. It is an important task to anyone with a stake or interest in
the political economy of the European Union to find out why that is and what to do about it.
The aim of this article is not to assess whether or not certain EU countries, sectors, or regions
are experiencing brain drain – rather, the aim is to map the political conversation on brain
drain at the EU level. The purpose of doing this is to complement the statistical picture of
brain drain with a more political picture that illuminates the contentious themes, issues, and
concerns that drive policy debates on the matter in Brussels and abroad – regardless of what
the statistics say. We know something of the statistical side, but very little has been done to
collect and systematize knowledge about the political treatment of brain drain at the EU-level.
As an increasingly topical issue in European political economy, it is important that this
oversight is addressed.
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The statistical picture of brain drain
It is useful to start an investigation into the European politics of brain drain by surveying what
we know and the different ways in which brain drain is made knowable. Several different
statistics are monitored and reports compiled at the European level by Commission personnel
– the one most relevant to brain drain is the Annual Report on Intra-EU Labour Mobility,
published since 2014 by the Directorate-General for Employment (DG EMPL). These reports
rely heavily on the EU Labour Force Survey.
In its latest version, from 2016, we learn that 11.3 million movers account for all intra-EU
migration. 8.5 million of those are employed or looking for work, equaling 3.6% of the EU’s
working-age population (Fries-Tersch, Tugran and Bradley, 2016). Out of the 8.5 million
workers, only half (4.4 million) are recent movers, meaning those who have moved in the last
ten years. To these amounts, we can also add 1.3 million cross-border workers (workers living
in their home state but working in another) and 2.0 million posted workers (workers employed
in their home state but carrying out temporary work in another). Because posted workers are
temporary and cross-border workers still reside in their home countries, they cannot be
understood as contributing directly to brain drain. Taken in the aggregate, European labor
mobility cannot be seen as very substantial, especially in comparison to mobility within the
United States, which is ten times higher in terms of both stocks and flows (Barslund and
Busse, 2016). This should be kept in mind in any discussion about brain drain in Europe. But
that does not preclude that some substantial impacts do occur on the level of a specific
country, region, or sector.
The overall pattern of labor mobility in the EU has remained very consistent: 98% of mobile
workers live in EU-15 countries (the ‘old’ Member States) and only 2% in EU-13 countries
(the ‘new’ Member States that joined after the 2004 accession) (Fries-Tersch, Tugran and
Bradley, 2016). The main countries of residence of working-age movers are Germany (2.7
million), the United Kingdom (2.1 million), Spain (1.4 million), Italy (1.1 million), France and
Switzerland (950,000 each). These six countries receive 75% of intra-EU labor mobility.
Regarding the main sending countries, Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Romania
together make up more than half of all movers. All movers tend to be younger and higher-
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educated than the national averages (Canetta, Fries-Tersch and Mabilia, 2014). The
movement of highly-educated people increased sharply after the crisis from 29% of recent
working-age movers in 2008 to 44% in 2015 (Fries-Tersch, Tugran and Bradley, 2016). In
2014, about half of EU-15 movers were highly educated compared to 24% of EU-13 movers
– about half of EU-13 movers have medium levels of education (Fries-Tersch and Mabilia,
2015).
These absolute numbers cannot tell us much about which countries might be experiencing
brain drain, but the 2014 Annual Report on Labour Mobility, in focusing on movements of the
young and highly-educated, hits closer to the mark. When we look at outflows (as a
percentage over the total population) in the last ten years of active workers between the ages
of 15-34, the five countries with the highest emigration rates are Romania (9%), Lithuania
(7.2%), Slovakia (6.5%), Latvia (6.2%), and Poland (6.2%) (Canetta, Fries-Tersch and
Mabilia, 2014). These countries (with the exception of Slovakia) are also the countries with
the highest overall rate of recent active EU movers (10% for Romania and Lithuania, 7% for
Latvia, 5% for Poland).
These numbers would suggest that brain drain is primarily an Eastern phenomenon, but
the 2015 Annual Report on Labour Mobility (Fries-Tersch and Mabilia, 2015) distinguishes
between two different forms of movement: East-West migration and South-North migration. It
identifies a decline in East-West migration and an increase in South-North migration when
comparing data from 2008 and 2013. This is especially driven by decreases in inflows and
increases in outflows in Italy and Spain. In many other important destination countries, similar
trends of decreasing Eastern and increasing Southern migration can also be seen. These
flows capture the effect of the Eurozone crisis years, where the Southern countries were much
harder hit than the Eastern ones, leading to large outflows of young and highly educated
citizens.
Emigration rates of most Member States increased in the years from 2008 to 2013,
especially in Hungary, Portugal, Cyprus, and Ireland (Fries-Tersch and Mabilia, 2015).
Although the emigration rate of some Eastern countries such as Romania, Lithuania, and
Latvia decreased in those years, they were still among the countries with the highest
emigration rates for nationals as a percentage of their total population. All EU-28 countries
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(except Denmark, Malta, and Iceland) saw net outflows of their nationals in 2013. In many
countries, immigration inflows from other Member States, European Free Trade Area
countries, or third countries offset the outflow of their own nationals, but this was not the case
in the Southern European countries (except for Italy), the Baltic countries, Ireland, Poland,
Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia.
The overall statistical picture does support a notion of two distinct migratory flows of
European labour: a steady flow of mostly medium-skilled Eastern workers moving West over
a longer duration of time, and a more sudden flow of highly-skilled Southern workers moving
North during the Eurozone crisis years. Based on this, we should expect a risk of brain drain
either in Eastern or Southern countries, but the flows from each region are driven by different
factors. The longer-term, steady Eastern flow can be explained by differences in wages and
working conditions (Galgóczi, Leschke and Watt, 2009), while the sudden Southern flow was
a direct consequence of the rapidly rising unemployment levels witnessed during the
Eurozone crisis (Galgóczi, Leschke and Watt, 2012). We can label the Eastern flow a ‘slow
drain’ and the Southern flow a ‘fast drain’.
There is good evidence that migrants from both the East and South are overqualified for
the jobs they take up in their destination countries (Galgóczi, Leschke and Watt, 2009, p. 25;
Tijdens and Klaveren, 2012; Fries-Tersch, Tugran and Bradley, 2016). This is more so the
case for EU-13 movers than for EU-15 movers. If high-skilled labor from the East does find
appropriate levels of employment in the West, there are still risks of negative externalities.
For example, recent attempts at quantifying the impact of the enlargement on cross-border
collaboration in scientific research demonstrates that the flow of high-skilled researchers to
EU-15 countries may reduce both the potential for knowledge spillover between countries and
the convergence of human and technological capital within Europe (Doria Arrieta, Pammolli
and Petersen, 2017).
This brings up a key question that the statistics have attempted, and failed, to completely
answer: are the negative externalities of brain drain offset by brain gain or brain circulation?
Studies differ on their answers to this question. The 2016 Annual Report on intra-EU Labour
Mobility notes that return mobility to EU-13 countries in the aggregate has remained stable
since 2009, although there are large fluctuations from country to country, some seeing
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significant increases in return mobility, others seeing decreases (Fries-Tersch, Tugran and
Bradley, 2016). Roughly 600,000 movers return from another EU country to their home
country per year – 250,000 of those to EU-13 countries and 350,000 to EU-15. The economic
crisis did not affect these numbers significantly for the EU-13, but return mobility did decrease
sharply for some EU-15 countries (Ireland, Portugal, and Italy). Returnees tend to be higher
educated than movers in general and national averages, and with 600,000 returnees
compared to yearly outflows of 870,000 at the EU level, we should expect return mobility to
alleviate brain drain to some extent.
Whether or not that is actually the case depends on the labor market situation of returnees.
Some studies support the notion that returnees enjoy a premium on their time abroad once
they come home and bring with them new skills and competences (Martin and Radu, 2012;
Zaiceva and Zimmermann, 2016). But other studies say it is not so clear. Because especially
EU-13 movers tend to be overqualified for their jobs abroad, some return mobility will not
result in upgraded human capital at home or offset the risks of brain drain (Hazans, 2012).
Such brain waste or downskilling can also lead to marginalization at home if highly qualified
citizens who have worked in low-skilled (but higher-paying) work abroad are then unable to
find high-skilled work at home (Kaczmarczyk, 2015). In general, the statistics on skills-
mismatches in European labor mobility varies substantially across countries and it is difficult
to draw any general conclusions from the data (Galgóczi, Leschke and Watt, 2012, pp. 27–
29).
The discussion on the statistical overview of intra-EU labor mobility and the risks of brain
drain should make clear that this is a complicated and multifaceted issue. Nearly all studies
on the phenomenon bring up the significant methodological issues that prevent any clear
conclusions (Barslund and Busse, 2016; Galgóczi, Leschke and Watt 2012). Simply relying
on data concerning emigration rates, for example, can obscure national and sectoral
specificities that may ameliorate the picture. For instance, the high emigration flows from
Spain and Poland are due mainly to the departure of non-national or non-EU immigrants (in
the Spanish case) or are simply reducing the oversupply of labor (in the Polish case)
(Schellinger, 2015). Some are calling this brain ‘overflow’ rather than ‘drain’, when domestic
labor markets cannot absorb the full amount of highly-educated individuals.
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There are also second-order effects that are difficult to capture in statistical snapshots. A
study on the German medical sector notes that large highly qualified emigration flows might
lead to the emergence of a brain drain chain reaction when acute labor shortages cause
employers to attract skilled workers from lower-income EU countries, where new labor
shortages in those countries will cause employers there to attract skilled workers from non-
EU countries (Teney and Siemsen, 2015). Another argument concerning brain gain states
that if the prospects of emigrating are higher abroad, it may incentivize more people to
educate themselves at home, theoretically balancing out some of those who leave with a
more highly educated workforce at home (Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2008).
Rather than disentangle these multiple obstacles to statistically representing brain drain, I
choose to engage directly with the politics of brain drain. From the statistics, we can take
away an appreciation for two different kinds of flows: a fast, crisis-driven flow from the South
and a slow, wage-driven flow from the East. We can also conclude that the risks of brain drain
are certainly present in both Southern and Eastern countries, but these risks are very
sensitive to national economic and political conditions. Finally, the question of skills looms
large over brain drain, both in terms of conditions on sending and receiving country labor
markets. Until now, there have been very few attempts to bring together the politics of both
intra-European migratory flows of skilled labor under a common analytical framework
investigating brain drain. In the next section, I discuss why this is an undertaking that requires
deeper interpretive sensitivity than we can muster in the statistical treatment of European
labor mobility.
The European politics of brain drain
The statistical picture of brain drain cannot account for the politics of brain drain. When the
statistical picture leaves room for doubt and interpretation, it becomes susceptible to framing.
There are several reasons why the statistics cannot fully reflect the European politics of brain
drain:
1. The statistics still leave too many things unknown. Bilateral mobility flows have only been
published by Eurostat since 2015, and even then only with a time lag of two years and
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with many blanks in the data (Barslund and Busse, 2016). There is no long-term data that
would allow an analysis of trends. We also know very little about the educational levels of
migrants, their careers, and forms of employment. This is because the statistics cannot
track individual movements, which creates significant lacks and uncertainties in the data.
There are always obligations to register in destination countries when taking up work
abroad, but not always obligations to de-register in your home country. And it is an open
question as to the extent to which either of these obligations tend to be honored by movers.
The aggregate nature of the statistics can also mask specific impacts on countries,
regions, and sectors.
2. The statistics do not reflect popular mood or sentiment. Citizens across Europe are more
likely to get their ‘facts’ on European labor mobility from sources other than official EU
statistical reports. Brexit makes this abundantly clear. Cultural concerns about national
identity and immigration are easily manipulated and exploited through popular, political
and media discourses (Hobolt, 2016; Schmidt, 2017). These concerns and manipulations
have shown themselves to be remarkably resilient to the material reality of labor mobility.
Because of point 1 above, experts do not speak with sufficient authority on the topic of
brain drain, and it is easy for politicians to stir up a brain drain controversy.
3. The statistics are not easily translated into policy proposals. There are no straightforward
solutions provided through any statistical evaluation of brain drain. Different policy actors
presented with the same data will reach vastly different conclusions and policy positions.
For example, communications from the European Commission have consistently found
that the scale of migration is too low to constitute a risk of brain drain in sending countries.2
Employer organizations consistently argue that skills mismatches are the cause of brain
drain and better education and training is the solution, and trade unions consistently argue
that stronger social protection systems and workers’ rights is the solution (Schellinger
2 See for example the memos, press releases, and speeches circulated in the wake of the first Employment and
Social Developments in Europe report in 2011: MEMO-11-916, IP-11-1552, SPEECH-12-76. Later
communications such as MEMO-13-384, MEMO-14-541, and SPEECH-14-115 state that any risks of brain drain
are offset by remittances, return migration, and decreases in unemployment levels, although they do recognize
risks to particular sectors such as health.
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2015; also supported by interview data). Brain drain, like so many other controversial
issues, is easily framed so as to cohere with preconceived political goals.
Because of these three characteristics of the brain drain phenomenon (uncertainty,
controversy, and open-endedness), it makes for a rich political topic that is highly open to
multiple interpretations and contestations. When looking at the political effects of labor
mobility, scholars have focused more attention on the flows of EU-13 movers following the
2004 enlargement than the flows of movers from Southern Europe during the Eurozone crisis.
Such work has addressed both the determinants and outcomes of Eastern migration after the
enlargement with respect to integration (Marques, 2010), welfare systems (Kureková, 2013),
cohesion policy (Farole, Rodríguez-Pose and Storper, 2011), and education structure (Huber
and Bock-Schappelwein, 2014). Studies on flows from Southern Europe tend to be subsumed
to larger-scale questions on Eurozone governance in the wake of the crisis, in particular to
questions of austerity (Barslund et al., 2014; Schellinger, 2015; Herr, Priewe and Watt, 2017).
More recent works are now starting to investigate notions of ‘fair mobility’, recognizing that
for European mobility to lead to win-win outcomes, policymakers have to take seriously the
allegations of social dumping (when workers from country A are employed in country B
according to wages and conditions of country B, thereby outcompeting labor in country A) on
one hand and complaints about brain drain on the other (Andor, 2015; Barslund and Busse,
2016; Dhéret and Ghimis, 2016). The taboo of questioning the win-win of intra-European labor
mobility is starting to break, especially following Brexit and the rise of populist politics (Hobolt,
2016; Farrell and Newman, 2017; Schmidt, 2017; Watt and Andor, 2017). This makes it a
timely and important endeavor to provide a thorough mapping of the European politics of
brain drain. In the next sections, I detail how I go about constructing and analyzing such a
map.
Data and methods
Any research attempting to map the European politics of brain drain will have to overcome
the following challenges:
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1. Brain drain is understood by political participants to have multiple different causes and
consequences, and the statistics provide no clear-cut answers. This allows multiple
different narratives to co-exist side-by-side and provides ample opportunity for contentious
political engagements.
2. In part because of the above, political interaction on brain drain relates to several different
policy initiatives. In my conversations with interviewees, all of the following policy areas
were brought forward, even in the same conversation: mobility, skills, cohesion, research,
vocational and educational training, higher education, development, macroeconomic
policy, etc. Limiting the analysis to just one of these areas would artificially restrict the
possible interpretations that drive the politics of brain drain.
3. Political interaction also spans several years. As the coming analysis will show, the first
mention of brain drain at the EU level was in the 1990s. Attention to the issue has since
grown tremendously, especially during the Eurozone crisis years. A full account of the
politics of brain drain should address this historical dimension to understand how and why
we got to where we are today.
4. Political interaction connects domestic-level politics to EU-level politics. The pains of brain
drain are felt within Member States, often within particular regions of states. This means
that concerted efforts must be made to identify, flag, and frame domestic problems of brain
drain in a manner that brings it to the attention of EU-level policymakers, telling them why
they should care and what they should do about it. When these efforts fail (as they often
do), brain drain remains under the radar.
To overcome these challenges, I rely on an approach that combines interviews with a
content analysis of the historical record of parliamentary questions that mention brain drain.
This two-pronged approach has several benefits. Concerning the first challenge, interviews
and content analysis both remain sensitive to multiple interpretations and narratives
surrounding brain drain. Concerning the second challenge, I allow the relevant policy areas
to emerge out of the analysis rather than define them from the outset. Concerning the third
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challenge, the historical record of parliamentary questions provides an opportunity to observe
changes in discourse over time. And concerning the fourth challenge, both parliamentary
questions and interviews give a deeper insight into how interest groups and policymakers
approach brain drain strategically by framing it in ways that provide traction in the policy
environment. As a qualitatitve multi-method approach, the combination of two different data
sources and methods increases robustness through a complementary mobilization of various
types of evidence (Lamont and Swidler, 2014).
Parliamentary questions
In legislative studies, parliamentary questions have been understood as harboring useful
information about the preferences and behavior of members of parliament, as well as how
they view their roles and responsibilities (Raunio, 1996; Martin, 2011). In the aggregate, the
analysis of such questions can tell us more about the functioning and position of parliaments
within the wider political and institutional system (Rozenberg and Martin, 2011) and the
interaction with media (Santen, Helfer and Aelst, 2015). Studies on parliamentary questions
at the EU-level stress their potential for linking the electorates of MEPs to European issues
and exercising executive and regulatory scrutiny (Proksch and Slapin, 2011; Auel and Raunio,
2014). Because MEPs are sensitive both to domestic-level issues and to the political
inclinations of their respective groups, they provide useful data on how brain drain is brought
from the domestic level to the EU-level and framed politically. The Parliament is also more
sensitive to popular concerns and sentiments than the other European institutions, which
makes it a good place to study the politicization of issues such as mobility.
Parliamentary questions are structured in such a way that they tell us much about EP-
Commission relations (and EP-Council, to a lesser degree) (Egeberg, Trondal and Vestlund,
2014). There are three different types of parliamentary questions: questions for oral answer,
questions for Question Time, and written questions. Questions for oral answer are dealt with
during plenary sittings and included in records of the debate; questions for Question Time are
also dealt with in plenary sittings during specific time slots reserved for questions; and written
questions are submitted to the Commission or Council and answered within three to six
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weeks. All three types of questions and their related answers are electronically archived on
the website of the European Parliament and are easily searchable.
I compiled a dataset of questions and answers through a simple keyword search on "brain
drain", looking for any mentions of the term in any part of the question or answer, including
both question titles and the actual body of text. The vast majority of questions in the dataset
are written questions. Some documents (fewer than ten) that turned up in the search results
and were retained in the dataset did not contain the actual words ‘brain drain’, but were still
related to the issue and must have been responding to metadata entries. Very few questions
(fewer than five) were discarded as they were not relevant to the European politics of brain
drain (for example, questions on emigration patterns of Russian nuclear scientists). Table 1
displays the number of questions found during each parliamentary period from 1999 onwards,
clearly indicating the increasing topicality of the issue over time.
TABLE 1. Number of parliamentary questions mentioning brain drain
I imported the entire text of questions and answers into the Discourse Network Analyzer
(DNA) software (Leifeld, 2013a). The DNA program is a qualitative content analysis tool with
network export facilities. I analyzed the imported text files for statements showing the different
ways brain drain was framed as a problem and the solutions offered to the problem. The
problem and solution dichotomy makes sense in the question and answer format of
parliamentary questions, and remains sufficiently sensitive to the multiple prevailing
interpretations. Statements were coded with the name and organization of the speaker and
analyzed according to the schemes displayed in Tables 2 and 3.
Parliamentary period 1999-2004 2004-2009 2009-2014 2014-2019 Total
Number of questions 5 26 43 31 105
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TABLE 2. Problems – How is brain drain defined as a problem?
Problem codes Definition
Austerity Austerity measures in response to the crisis are exacerbating brain
drain
Competitiveness Brain drain is hurting the competitive edge of European companies
or universities
Development The EU is draining skilled workers from developing countries
outside the EU
Eastern drain Workers in East European countries are leaving for the West in
large numbers
Economic crisis Brain drain caused and exacerbated by the financial and economic
crisis
R&D Under-investment in research infrastructure, research funding,
innovation
Shortages There is a lack of qualified personnel in a specific sector
Skills and training Vocational training and education facilities or conditions are
inadequate, skills mismatches




Human capital is leaving the EU for third countries (typically EU
scientists going to the US)
Working conditions Comparatively poor wages, working conditions, and rights are
causing people to emigrate from their home countries
Table 2 displays the coding scheme used to analyze those statements about brain drain
that define it as a problem. This set of statements applies mostly to MEP discourse, as they
are the actors raising brain drain as an issue. Vice versa, Table 3 displays the coding scheme
used to analyze the statements that offer solutions to problems of brain drain. This set applies
mostly to discourse from the EU institutions, in particular from the different Commissioners.
Having said that, both MEPs and Commissioners did offer their own interpretations as to both
problems and solutions, and in some of the ways that questions were framed, solutions were
implicitly suggested. Both the problem and solution coding schemes were developed
iteratively and in conversation with the interview data to ensure that codes captured crucial
material while remaining mutually exclusive yet collectively exhaustive.
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TABLE 3. Solutions – How are questions about brain drain answered?
Solution codes Definition
Austerity Countries should focus on restoring economic and financial stability as
well as sound public finances
Circular
migration
Brain drain is temporary, skilled workers will return home, remittances
Cohesion policy Brain drain should be addressed through the use of the European
Social Fund, the European Regional Development Fund, etc.
Development Development programs and cooperation to invest in public services,
health, infrastructure in developing countries
Increase
mobility
Cross-border mobility is a fundamental right, increased intra-EU
mobility can address brain drain and labor shortages (EURES)
Job creation Create more jobs in sending countries, Youth Guarantee, Youth
Employment Initiative, etc.
Member States This is a member-state issue, and it is primarily their responsibility to
resolve it, the European Semester
Private sector The role of the private sector should be increased to address brain
drain
R&D Invest more in research infrastructure, research funding, innovation
Refutation The existence of a brain drain problem is refuted on the grounds of
evidence to the contrary
Restrict mobility Intra-European mobility must be decreased to combat brain drain in
sending countries and social dumping in receiving ones
Skills and
training
Reforming education and training systems, upskilling, re-skilling
Working
conditions
Improve pay and career prospects in sending countries, labor market
reforms, social rights and security
The DNA software exports a matrix of coded statements that can be interpreted as a two-
mode network that draws a link between an actor and a concept when that actor mentions it.
Time points are given by dates of the posted questions and answers. From this two-mode
network, one-mode concept networks can be computed such that a tie is drawn between two
concepts when an actor mentions both. The weight of the tie is increased when other actors
also mention both concepts or when the same actor does it again in a different text. When all
ties have been drawn for a given period, a network emerges that can be interpreted as a
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graphical visualization of the discourse. Central nodes are figure more frequently in the
discourse and thick ties depict bundles of concepts that are often used together.
The software has been applied to a number of different policy debates in various settings,
including climate change in the U.S. (Fisher, Waggle and Leifeld, 2012; Fisher, Leifeld and
Iwaki, 2013), German pension politics (Leifeld, 2013b, 2016), software patents in the EU
(Leifeld and Haunss, 2012), the independence of regulatory agencies (Ingold, Varone and
Stokman, 2013), and policy change after school shootings (Hurka and Nebel, 2013).
By analyzing discourse networks, I do not mean to reduce the policy debate to an artifact
of social network analysis in order to predict and generalize. Rather, I aim to open up the
debate by providing an additional entry point for research and making the underlying relational
and discursive structures more tangible as objects of study that can enter into a productive
dialogue with other methods of analysis (Buch-Hansen, 2014). Controversies such as brain
drain are ‘reduction-resistant’ (Venturini, 2010, p. 262) and are best explored through plural
approaches that make complexity legible (Whatmore, 2009; Venturini, 2012; Marres, 2015).
Interviews
Coding parliamentary questions is a good way to get a bird’s-eye view of the political
conversation around brain drain as it evolves over time. But to gain a deeper insight into how
brain drain is constructed and negotiated politically, interviews with key policy actors provide
more detail and a different angle of attack. Table 4 provides an anonymized overview of
interviewees by ranks, organizations, and dates interviewed. The Commission services
represented by the interviewees include the Directorate-Generals for Employment (DG EMPL
– the majority of interviewees were from here); Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship,
and SMEs (DG GROW); Communications Networks, Content & Technology (DG CONNECT);
and Education and Culture (DG EAC). Interviewees were identified through desk research
and referrals. I sought a balance between think tanks, trade union representatives, employer
organizations, and Commission personnel.
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TABLE 4. Overview of interviewees by rank, organization, and dates interviewed
Rank Organization Date interviewed Code
Senior Adviser BusinessEurope 13 March 2017 B1
Research Fellow Centre for European Policy Studies
(CEPS)
09 March 2017 T1
Researcher Centre for European Policy Studies
(CEPS)
09 March 2017 T2
Member ETUC Youth Committee 07 April 2017 U1
Member ETUC Youth Committee 18 May 2017 U2
Member ETUC Youth Committee 17 May 2017 U3
Senior Policy
Adviser
EuroChambres 10 March 2017 B2
Senior Adviser EuroCommerce 09 March 2017 B3
Director European Association of Craft, Small
and Medium-Sized Enterprises
(UEAPME)
15 March 2017 B4
Economic Data
Analyst
European Commission 16 May 2017 E1
Policy Officer European Commission 15 May 2017 E2
Former
Commissioner
European Commission 23 May 2017 E3
Director European Commission 16 May 2017 E4
Director European Commission 19 May 2017 E5
Head of Unit European Commission 18 May 2017 E6
Deputy Head of
Unit
European Commission 15 May 2017 E7
Senior Expert European Commission 15 May 2017 E8
Policy Officer European Commission 16 May 2017 E9
Policy Assistant European Commission 16 May 2017 E10
Deputy Head of
Unit
European Commission 19 May 2017 E11
Deputy Head of
Unit
European Commission 19 May 2017 E12
Senior Policy
Analyst
European Policy Centre (EPC) 08 March 2017 T3
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Advisor European Trade Union
Confederation (ETUC)
10 March 2017 U4
Advisor European Trade Union
Confederation (ETUC)
10 March 2017 U5
Senior
Researcher
European Trade Union Institute
(ETUI)
17 March 2017 U6
Senior
Researcher
European Trade Union Institute
(ETUI)
08 March 2017 U7
Political Advisor Group of the Progressive Alliance of
Socialists & Democrats
22 May 2017 P1
The interviews were not recorded to allow interviewees to speak more freely and at ease.
Instead, I took extensive notes during the interviews and reflected on the content of each
interview in field memos that were written immediately afterward. There is a balance between
detailed records and more detailed off-the-record information when interviewing (Harvey,
2011). I opted for the latter to boost the potential for generating novel insights, and because
detailed and carefully phrased records already exist in the form of parliamentary questions.
Off-the-record interviews are a stronger complement to the parliamentary questions. I cite
interviews in the analysis by referring to the codes given in the last column.
Analysis
I analyze the evolution of the European politics of brain drain over three stages defined with
reference to the parliamentary periods given in Table 1. Stage 1 deals with the time period
from 1999-2009 – the Prodi Commission (1999-2004) and the first Barrosso Commission
(2004-2009). Because there are only five questions asked about brain drain during the Prodi
Commission, I merge this into Barrosso I for expediency. Stage 2 runs from 2009-2014 (the
second Barrosso Commission). Separating Barrosso I and II allows me to more closely map
the effects of the Eurozone crisis (2009-2014) on the politics of brain drain, as these periods
closely map on to each other. It also provides a better balance in terms of the amount of
questions analyzed in each stage. Stage 3 from 2014-2019 (the Juncker Commission) is
ongoing at the time of writing, and it shows that brain drain is still topical, even though the
worst of the Eurozone crisis has passed for the time being. Each stage combines data from
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the coding of parliamentary questions with interview data to provide a full account of the
European politics of brain drain.
The six discourse network diagrams presented in the following were drawn in the Visone
software (Brandes and Wagner, 2004). They are laid out according to degree centrality
(concepts towards the center of the diagrams are mentioned more often) and thicker edge
weights indicate stronger ties (concepts that are mentioned together more often). I deleted
nodes mentioned fewer than three to five times in each diagram to increase legibility, retaining
the codes that more strongly indicate the nature of the discourse during each stage and
making their ties to each other more visible. Each stage contains two discourse networks:
one for MEP questions and one for Commission and Council answers.
Stage 1: 1999-2009
The first stage of the analysis spans the years from 1999-2009, encompassing the Prodi
Commission and the first Barrosso Commission. As there were only five mentions of brain
drain in the parliamentary questions during the Prodi Commission, I have included them
alongside the first Barrosso Commission. Because most of the interaction here is over a
decade old, the analysis of this stage relies primarily on the parliamentary questions rather
than interviews.
Figure 1 depicts the discourse network of MEP questions posed in this period. The most
immediately apparent insight is that brain drain was discussed primarily as a problem of brains
entering and exiting the Union, not as an intra-EU affair. We see this in the central placement
of the ‘Development’ node and the second-most central ‘Third country emigration’ node.
The ‘Development’ node covers questions relating mostly to the impact of European
development initiatives on the emigration of high-skilled labor from African and Asian
developing countries. For example, Nirj Deva of the European People’s Party (EPP) noted in
2008 (Written Question E-4120/08) that the Cotonou Agreement only allocated EU funds for
primary education in developing countries, which does nothing to stem the tide of migrants
leaving for better education opportunities abroad. Many of the questions also pertain to labor
shortages in the health sector of African countries struggling with the HIV/AIDS epidemic
(partly denoted by the ‘Shortages’ node). For example, Kader Arif of the Party of European
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Socialists (PES) asked the Council (Written Question E-0524/07) whether any health policies
in the area of development were being considered that would provide long-term solutions to
the problem of lacking health workers in developing countries, particularly African countries
where the number of health workers emigrating each year exceeds the number of newly-
trained staff.
FIGURE 1. Discourse network of MEP brain drain questions: 1999-2009
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Where the ‘Development’ node reflects concern with the EU draining from developing
countries to the Single Market, the ‘Third country emigration’ node reflects concern with drains
from the Single Market to other countries, primarily the U.S. This means that neither of the
two most frequently asked questions in Stage 1 concerned intra-EU brain drain, which is
surprising given that the period covers the years immediately following the 2004 enlargement.
Concerns with third country emigration mostly concern the loss of European scientists to
American universities and the related impact on the competitiveness of European research,
innovation, and economy. For example, Brice Hortefeux of the EPP asked in 2003 (Written
Question E-1248/03) how the Commission plans to address the statistic that 75% of European
PhD students trained in the U.S. have no intention to return. These questions are closely
related to the ‘Problem - R&D’ node, featuring frequent comparisons between low European
spending on research and development and high American spending and also to the ‘Working
conditions’ node, which covers comparisons between European and American working
conditions and wages for researchers.
There are only three mentions of an Eastern brain drain in Stage 1 (E-0264/05, E-3941/06,
and H-0700/06), and all are commenting on the potential risks of large scale emigration of
skilled workers as the transitional measures are eased out following the 2004 enlargement. It
is still too early at this stage to see any political repercussions of an Eastern drain, even if
workers have already started moving.
Figure 2 depicts the answers given by the Commission and Council to questions posed in
Stage 1. In response to the development problems identified by MEPs, the Commission
defends the benefits of labor mobility through the concept of ‘circular migration’. The argument
goes, as illustrated by António Vitorino, Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs in the
Prodi Commission in his response to Written Question E-2986/03, as follows:
In some cases, the costs of brain-drain seem to be more than compensated by other
benefits for the sending country, such as remittances, transfer of know-how and the
development of closer commercial links through the presence of natural persons.
Policies that clearly define temporary status and encourage return are key measures to
prevent possible negative effects.
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This line is also followed during the first Barrosso Commission where the standard response
to development problems was to ‘turn brain drain into "brain gain" (through circular migration
and return programmes’ (Commissioner for Development Louis Michel in answer to Written
Question E-3333/06).
FIGURE 2. Discourse network of Commission/Council brain drain answers: 1999-2009
While migrants from developing countries are encouraged to return through circular
migration arguments, the Commission response to questions of European research
competitiveness is to increase mobility and encourage internationalization of researchers:
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‘The framework programme aims to make European research more attractive and to
create more mobility for researchers. That is to be boosted by the People Programme,
dedicated to structuring the mobility, training and career development of researchers
throughout Europe. This is essential to help create a single labour market of
researchers’ (Commissioner for Research Janez Potočnik in reply to question H-
0084/06).
There is no recognition that brain drain exists for European researchers within the Single
Market – instead, mobility is integral to creating attractive work environments and careers in
research. This is to be supported by increasing both public and private sector spending on
R&D. The cluster of tightly integrated nodes in the top half of Figure 2 represent these
arguments (R&D, working conditions, increase mobility, private sector).
We can summarize the first stage of brain drain politics as encouraging migrants from
developing countries to send remittances and return home with new skills, but encouraging
European researchers to circulate within the Single Market while upgrading their working
conditions through investments in R&D. Some MEPs did bring up the notion that investments
in developing countries are equally important for creating sustainable, long-term solutions to
brain drain, but these arguments tended to be met by encouraging migrants to circulate and
return. Although some programs entailing investments in the health sectors of developing
countries were also brought forward, there is a much clearer and more interlinked discourse
in support of raising investments and working conditions for European researchers. This
marks a clear split in Commission discourse when confronted with two types of brain drain,
one exiting the Union and one entering it.
When it comes to the few questions on Eastern drain, there is an illuminating exchange
between Ján Figel, Commissioner for Education, Training & Culture, and MEP Justas Vincas
Paleckis (PES) (H-0700/06). Paleckis wants to know whether the Commission will consider
establishing a special fund to compensate new Member States that are sending specialists
and qualified workers to the old Member States. Figel’s response shows the split in
Commission thinking that will come to define the European politics of brain drain in future
years. After reasserting the sanctity of free movement, he makes two points: first, Eastern
workers often stay for a limited time only, send remittances, and return home with new skills
– this is the circular migration argument. Second, although some workers are draining from
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East to West, highly educated workers in the West are leaving for the U.S. due to wage
differentials: ‘The problem of brain-drain, insofar as it exists, seems more linked to the salary
differential between the country of origin and destination countries than to the quality of the
education systems in migrants’ countries of origin’. The answer to this problem, he says, lies
in the good use of structural funds to ensure growth, job creation, and convergence to
eradicate wage differences.
These two answers imply contradictory logics of action: circulation implies doing nothing
(as in the case of developing countries), but wage differentials imply using the structural funds
to invest (as in the case of third country emigration). The solutions to the problems of brains
entering and exiting the Union are mirrored in the approach to intra-EU drain, where they exist
side-by-side but with no clear preference, yet, for one or the other. Their juxtaposition creates
a space of opportunities for EU action that spans laissez-faire to interventionist policies.
Stage 2: 2009-2014
The second stage begins with the Barrosso II Commission in 2009. The enlargement is five
years in the past and the financial crisis, soon to become the Eurozone debt crisis, is
unfolding. Figure 3 depicts the discourse network of MEP questions asked during this stage.
Compared to Stage 1, the picture has changed completely. Considerations of brains
entering or exiting the Union are relegated to the periphery – everything now is about youth
unemployment in Europe. The ‘Youth unemployment’ node is very closely connected to the
nodes on ‘Economic crisis’, ‘Southern drain’, and ‘Problem - R&D’. As an example of a
question illustrating this discourse, consider this intervention from Ioannis A. Tsoukalas of the
EPP (Written Question E-007955/12):
The financial crisis in the EU has led many well-educated people to leave their country
because of unemployment and the unavailability of well-paid jobs. Countries such as
Greece have educated and trained their citizens at the expense of the state, yet because
of the crisis are losing their most valuable asset: their skilled and qualified people.
Recent reports show that not only young workers but also highly-skilled academics (the
educators of generations to come) are leaving en masse. As a result of this massive
brain drain, the return on investment from educating the workforce is very small for the
countries hit hardest by the crisis, and hence there is very little incentive to invest in
academic institutions.
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FIGURE 3. Discourse network of MEP brain drain questions: 2009-2014
During Stage 2, there is a clear understanding in the Parliament that brain drain primarily
has to do with the flight of highly educated young people from Southern to Northern Europe
as a consequence of high unemployment caused by the crisis. The Eastern drain is a more
peripheral issue during this stage, and it is not strongly linked to the ‘Youth unemployment’ or
‘Economic crisis’ nodes. This supports research stating that Eastern countries were not
particularly hard hit by the crisis compared to the Southern ones, with comparatively much
smaller effects on migration patterns from the East, which are still driven by longer-running
differences in wages and working conditions rather than short-term shocks to the labor
markets (Galgóczi, Leschke and Watt, 2012; Barslund, Busse and Schwarzwälder, 2015;
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Zaiceva and Zimmermann, 2016). That R&D figures relatively prominently in Stage 2 implies
a connection to the Stage 1 questions that also brought up low levels of investment in
Southern Europe – some MEPs may have seen an opportunity to frame these questions in a
new light when already-identified problems are exacerbated by the crisis.
In terms of solutions, the MEPs show no clear preference for any one particular treatment
and the menu of remedies spans job creation, skills and training, working conditions, and
cohesion policy. The dynamic is mostly one of asking the Commission what they intend to do
about the mounting problems. The split between cohesion policy as a solution on one hand
and skills and training on the other echoes the division identified in stage 1 between circular
migration and investment. Both of these divisions differ in where they place the burden for
addressing the identified challenges: either it is a question about the supply of labor or the
demand for labor. Training and circulation imply that when workers are skilled and mobile,
labor will reallocate itself and the crisis will pass. But the arguments concerning cohesion
policy or investment in R&D or in the health systems of developing countries follow a
contradictory logic. Here it is a question about the demand side and addressing structural
differences in economies through intervention. One does not necessarily rule out the other,
but they entail different courses of action.
Looking at Figure 4, we find this division mirrored in Commission/Council responses, but
with a clear preference towards supply-side thinking: the central placement of the ‘Increase
mobility’ and ‘Skills and training’ nodes reveal this. The mobility argument in Stage 2 is that
labor shortages, unemployment, and mismatches can be alleviated by encouraging people to
move to a different Member State, meaning encouraging the movement from the high-
unemployment South to the low-unemployment North. One of the tools for doing so is
EURES, the European Job Mobility Portal, which is a network between the Commission and
the public employment services of the Member States for matching jobseekers and employers
across national boundaries. Especially the 2012 initiative ‘Your First EURES Job’ was
specifically targeted towards young people as a response to the youth unemployment crisis.
Labor mobility was seen as an ‘adjustment mechanism’ to alleviate economic shocks and a
win-win proposition for both the South and North.
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FIGURE 4. Discourse network of Commission/Council brain drain answers: 2009-2014
The mobility argument places the burden for addressing unemployment squarely on the
shoulders of the unemployed, and this is bolstered by the ‘Skills and training’ argument. Part
of the ‘Skills and training’ arguments were directly connected to increasing mobility, for
example by using the Skills Panorama to identify skills mismatches and using the Professional
Qualifications Directive to ensure cross-border recognition of skills (see Commissioner for
Employment László Andor’s responses to Written Question E-006509/12). Transitions from
school-to-work were also a central topic, partly through aligning education systems with labor
market needs and developing practical training in companies (traineeships). The link from
–– 29 ––
CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF GLOBALISATION AND REGIONALISATION
www.warwick.ac.uk/csgr
here to the ‘Job creation’ node is explained by the Youth Guarantee program, which is a
logical extrapolation of the emphasis on skills and training. The Guarantee was a commitment
by all Member States to provide all youth under the age of 25 an offer of a job, continued
education, apprenticeship, or traineeship within four months of becoming unemployed or
leaving formal education. It was funded by Member States and topped up by the European
Social Fund and €6 billion Youth Unemployment Initiative.
On the surface, the Youth Guarantee shows how the strict separation between demand-
side and supply-side interventions breaks down in complex policy environments where
compromise, consensus, and working solutions are quickly needed. While the Guarantee is
partly addressed at boosting the employability of workers, it is backed by cohesion policy
funding to stimulate the crisis-stricken economies and create jobs. But when looking into the
arguments covered by the ‘Cohesion policy’ node, nearly all of them concern the use of
structural funds to reform and invest in national education and training systems and ease the
transition of youth into labor markets. It is hard to read this as anything other than a
continuation of the employability, supply-side logic that would see the crisis overcome by
making youth more skilled and mobile. Missing from this logic are considerations of Eurozone
governance, debt, and the structural macroeconomic differences plaguing the cohesion of the
Union and the economies of the indebted South (Blyth, 2015).
Interview data supports the notion that the solution to unemployment during the crisis years
was characterized by a consensus on using mobility to alleviate the shock.3 Brain drain
considerations were secondary to the more immediate challenges of reducing unemployment
levels and ensuring fiscal stability in the South: mobility contributed to solving both of those
problems, and the expectation was that circular and return migration would upgrade human
capital and productivity in the South after the crisis passed. Politically, this was understood
as a center-right consensus, even within the Commission – theoretically, it was informed by
neoliberal economics and the notion of optimal currency areas.4 Some interviewees referred
to the idea of using labor mobility to alleviate economic shocks as 'textbook economics', which
suggests the hegemony of this line of thinking.5
3 Interview E1, E3, E6, and P1.
4 Interview E3 and P1.
5 Interview E6 and E11.
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Encouraging labor mobility during the crisis was one part of the remedy, but it was closely
connected to the austerity doctrine. In the absence of a common Eurozone budget and limited
scope for monetary policy, the only option for returning to fiscal stability was for the crisis-
stricken countries to cut spending. The institutional setup of the Eurozone and the current
budgetary rules make it impossible for Member States to carry out counter-cyclical policies
such as stimulating their economies through spending or cutting interest rates on their own.
This was the rationale underlying the TINA (‘There is no alternative’) arguments in support of
austerity that were frequently communicated by DG ECFIN (Economic and Financial Affairs).
Stronger intervention by the European Central Bank, as was suggested by center-left political
groups, was not seriously considered, because labor mobility was seen as a sufficient
corrective to the shock.6 Some characterized this as a 'German perspective' that held up
American levels of labor mobility as the target – something that will be difficult to achieve in a
Union of 24 languages and diverse social systems.7
Naturally, there was resistance to this center-right consensus from other parts of the
political spectrum and certain Member States. Some people were quick to point out that
relying overly much on mobility as a corrective would impair the ability of the crisis-stricken
countries to recover and rebuild; Portugal and Ireland, for example, never accepted the notion
that sending people abroad was complementary to a recovery at home.8 There was also the
concern that if the best-educated leave, then you risk the future sustainability of pension
systems and welfare states.9 The Youth Guarantee can be seen as a corrective to this, but
whether it was up to the task or sufficiently ambitious was a matter of debate. Other criticisms
called for an enlarged role for EU structural funds and cohesion policy to address the
macroeconomic differences between Member States. When Portugal and Spain joined the
Union in 1986, there was a massive expansion of the structural funds on the understanding




9 Interview P1 and E11.
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convergence. Due to concerns about the cost of doing so, a similar expansion of structural
funds did not follow the Eastern enlargement.10
The issue of brain drain during the crisis years drives two points home: the EU-level
treatment of brain drain is inseparable from the policy response to the Eurozone crisis – and
the policy response to the Eurozone crisis displays the inseparability of political preferences
and economic assumptions. The low scale of EU labor mobility makes it possible to maintain
assumptions of circular migration as a driver of convergence. Doing so makes it possible to
maintain political preferences against fiscal transfers and counter-cyclical policies. There is a
coherence here in terms of fast versus slow-moving brain drain trends and policy responses.
The crisis required a fast response (mobility plus austerity) that worked within the set
institutional and logical limits of the bureaucracy, and this co-produced (shaped and was
shaped by) a fast drain of skilled Southern migrants moving north. The slower-moving Eastern
trend allows greater scope for exploring the tensions within the Commission between
contending political preferences and economic assumptions, which I look more closely at in
the next section.
Stage 3: 2014-2019
In Stage 3, we have put the worst of the crisis years behind us, but the EU has not emerged
entirely unscathed. Following the 2016 Brexit vote, labor mobility has only become
increasingly contentious. According to many interviewees, it is in these most recent years that
brain drain has featured most intensely in debates and communications between the EU
institutions – something corroborated by the increasing number of parliamentary questions
bringing up the issue. Brain drain is just one aspect of labor mobility’s ‘dark side’; other sides
include welfare tourism and social dumping, topics that are the mirror image of brain drain
reflected in the receiving countries. The ascendance of all three of these issues alongside the
Brexit vote suggests that the taboo of questioning the win-win proposition of labor mobility
has been broken in the EU.
Figure 5 displays the discourse network of MEP brain drain questions during Stage 3. The
network, unlike the others, is not organized around any central node. Instead, we can discern
10 Interview E11.
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two different sets of interlinked nodes representing two different discourses: one is an axis
comprised of the Southern drain, economic crisis, and austerity problem nodes, and the other
is an axis comprised of the Eastern drain, working conditions, and shortages problem nodes.
The first set is a continuation of the discussion observed during Stage 2, but now with less
emphasis on youth and more emphasis on questioning the austerity remedy (Southern MEPs
were in no position to challenge austerity earlier, but now the consensus is eroding). The
second set shows that it is only recently that Eastern Europe has gotten more vocal in calling
attention to the negative externalities of labor mobility.
FIGURE 5. Discourse network of MEP brain drain questions: 2014-2019
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We can also observe that the Southern and Eastern drains are understood as distinct
problems in MEP discourse: the Southern one as exacerbated by the economic crisis and
austerity and the Eastern one as driven by the gap in wages and working conditions. Labor
shortages are also more frequently identified in the East, particulary in the area of health.
Problems of R&D spending and demographics are connected to both the East and the South,
but demographics are more frequently mentioned in connection to the Southern drain. After
the immediate shock of the crisis years, MEPs are now looking further into the future and
concerning themselves with questions of long-term sustainability and convergence.
When we look at Commission/Council responses, depicted in Figure 6, a continuation in
thinking from the second Barrosso Commission to the Juncker Commission can be identified.
The calls to increase European labor mobility remain the most dominant argument, and this
node is tightly interlinked with the ‘Cohesion policy’ and ‘Skills and training’ nodes. The only
difference is that cohesion policy has swapped places with skills, moving closer into the center
of the discourse. When looking into the content of cohesion policy arguments, we find that
they are still oriented towards employability and skills. For example, Commissioner for
Research Carlos Moedas, in his answers to Written Questions E-010225/15 and E-
003247/15, notes that cohesion policy funds are being used by several Member States to
fund doctoral training programs. Commissioner for Employment Marianne Thyssen, in her
answers to questions E-001947/15, E-008851/15, and E-015052/2015, also notes that
cohesion policy funds support investments in education, training, and school-to-work
transitions. Brain drain is clearly constituted in terms of supply-side employability policies.
This makes it unsurprising that the first official policy action to address intra-EU brain drain
finds its home within the New Skills Agenda for Europe. The Skills Agenda contains ten
actions aimed at upgrading European human capital in support of employability, growth, and
competitiveness. The actions include such initiatives as a Skills Guarantee, a review of the
European Qualifications Framework, and a ‘Digital Skills and Jobs Coalition’. On the topic of
brain drain, the Communication announcing the Agenda notes that ‘better local interaction
between education and training on the one hand and the labor market on the other, supported
by targeted investment, can also limit brain drain and help develop, retain and attract the
talent needed in specific regions and industries’ (European Commission, 2016a, p. 11). Action
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8 in the Communication proposes a further analysis of the issue of brain drain and the sharing
of best practices as regards effective ways of tackling the problem.
FIGURE 6. Discourse network of Commission/Council brain drain answers: 2014-2019
In the current political climate, brain drain has become entirely subsumed to the question
of skills and skills mismatches in particular. According to the Skills Agenda, mismatches in
skills are one of the main obstacles in the way of European employability, competitiveness,
and growth: ‘Skills gaps and mismatches are striking. Many people work in jobs that do not
match their talents. At the same time, 40% of European employers have difficulty finding
people with the skills they need to grow and innovate’ (European Commission, 2016a, p. 2).
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The connection to brain drain is that a closer link between education systems and the labor
market will ensure that graduates quickly find a job. The argument goes that when the supply
and demand for skills is mismatched, brain drain occurs. We can also find this argument in
the 2015 version of the Employment and Social Developments in Europe report: ‘In addition
to global competitive challenges, future EU growth will be under greater pressure due to the
steady decline of the working-age population in most EU Member States, which may combine
or exacerbate skills mismatch in regional labour markets, often resulting in brain drain’
(European Commission, 2016b, p. 14).
Whether skills mismatches result in brain drain was a question that interviewees disagreed
on. Employer organizations are convinced that this is the case,11 and they were joined in that
analysis by several Commission staff.12 The trade union representatives, on the other hand,
do not believe skills to be strongly connected to brain drain, finding it a too individualistic take
on the problem. Instead, they would highlight the lack of high quality jobs in the sending
countries as the main driver, alongside a need for higher wages and better working
conditions.13 There were several other Commission staff who agreed with this sentiment,
saying that the impact of the Skills Agenda on brain drain would be negligible at best and
highly uncertain.14 Upskilling Europeans is certainly not a bad idea, but the limited spending
and competence in the area of skills means that macroeconomic factors are much more likely
to be in the driving seat. There is no straightforward way of explaining the split in positions on
this between different Commission staff – disagreements were observed within the same
service and unit.
In light of this internal disagreement, an important question to answer is: why is brain drain
addressed within the Skills Agenda? When asked about this, interviewees agreed that it was
a top-down command issued on the basis of the political situation in the Baltics, especially
Lithuania and Latvia. Emigration and brain drain was described as the most important political
area in these countries, on the level of the refugee crisis.15 Valdis Dombrovskis, the current
Latvian Commission Vice-President for the Euro and Social Dialogue, was instrumental in
11 Interview B1, B2, B3, and B4.
12 Interview E2, E5, E7
13 Interview U1, U2, U3, U4, and U5.
14 Interview E1, E4, E6, E9, E10
15 Interview E9.
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putting this on the agenda at the highest level of the Commission.16 That it was inserted into
the Skills Agenda rather than some other policy seems to be more of an accident of timing
and expediency, although we have to note the strong coherence here with the preferences of
employer organizations and the longer-running discursive dominance of a mobility and skills
logic, already identified in Stage 2.
The fact remains that there are at least three different answers as to which policy area
should be addressing brain drain, and the answers depend on who you ask. If you ask
employer organizations, the answer is the Skills Agenda specifically, and education and
training systems generally. If you ask trade unions, there is more emphasis on the
transportability of social security systems, workers' rights, job creation and wages – this
places brain drain under the social pillar. If you ask economists and other technical experts
(inside or outside the Commission), the answer is cohesion policy and macroeconomic
governance of the Eurozone.17 The range of answers shows the scope for framing brain drain
towards preconceived political ends, and the uncertainties and controversies surrounding the
issue have precluded experts from asserting ownership of the issue. Because of this, a
political mapping and discussion of the evolution of the policy debate, as represented here
over three stages, should help policymakers and scholars reflect on the value of checking
how economic assumptions and political preferences cohere among involved stakeholders.
Discussion and conclusion
Mobility is the most tangible and most popular of the EU’s fundamental freedoms, and it plays
an indispensable role in fostering better life opportunities for citizens and economic growth
for states. Labor mobility is not very high in the EU, all things considered, and the Commission
and other policymakers are right to work towards increasing the stocks and flows of intra-
European migration. I want to stress that to map the politics of brain drain is not to argue for
a reduction in the freedom of movement. Rather, the study should be seen as a recognition
that a serious engagement with the political implications of labor mobility’s negative
16 Interview E1, E9, and E10.
17 Interview T1, T2, P1, E3, and E11.
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externalities is paramount if we want to continue to enjoy European freedom of movement in
face of mounting political pressures.
After providing a statistical overview of the state of intra-European labor mobility and the
difficulties of assessing brain drain, I conclude that the European politics of brain drain are
better approached discursively due to the uncertainty, controversy, and open-endedness of
the issue. I conducted the analysis according to a qualitative multi-method logic (Lamont and
Swidler, 2014), relying equally on parliamentary questions and interviews, as well as the
documentary record of policy initiatives and communications related to brain drain. Such an
approach overcomes the four challenges I identified with studying brain drain politics at the
European level: multiple interpretations, multiple policy initiatives, interaction on the issue
spanning at least two decades, and interactions that connect domestic politics to the EU level.
I analyzed the evolution of brain drain politics over three different stages: 1999-2009, 2009-
2014, and 2014-2019. Engagement during the first stage mostly concerned the drain of brains
into and out of the EU: skilled workers (mostly African doctors) entering the Union, or
researchers leaving for the U.S. Nonetheless, some preliminary interaction over Eastern
European drain following the 2004 enlargement did occur, and in the treatment of all three of
these types of brain drain, I identified a tension between laissez-faire and interventionist policy
responses. The analysis of Stage 2 revolved around youth unemployment and the Eurozone
crisis. Here, I reflected on how the center-right consensus on a remedy of mobility plus
austerity can be understood as a fast response to a fast-moving crisis that worked within the
set parameters of institutional and political logics – but this response also evoked resistance
from the center-left, who mobilized around the need for updating EU mechanisms to allow for
counter-cyclical policies.
We might initially be surprised that a monumental event such as the Eastern Enlargement
did not lead to greater attention within the Parliament to the risks of brain drain already in the
first stage analyzed here (1999-2009), but we can answer this puzzle in several ways. First,
as discussed in the statistical section, there were no numbers available on which to base
criticisms or orient discussions around. More systematic collection and presentation of data
did not begin until later, with the biggest milestone perhaps being the publication by the
Commission of the first Employment and Social Developments in Europe report in 2011.
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Second, some interviewees also suggested that we should expect a time lag from the
inclusion of new Member States until they start to assert themselves in higher-level political
games due to socialization and learning. The strong standing of several ambitious Eastern
politicians in key positions in Juncker’s cabinet would go some way to explaining the current
recognition of brain drain. Finally, in the years following the Enlargement, Western countries
also had the option of threatening to prolong transitional measures if Eastern countries
worried too loudly about brain drain. For all of these reasons, we should not be surprised that
the politics of brain drain took a while to manifest themselves more centrally.
This split between left and right politics, or Keynesian and neo-liberal economics, is
mirrored within the Commission itself. In the Stage 3 treatment of brain drain under the
umbrella of the Skills Agenda, this division also has to be navigated. Although the supply-
side, employability logic still seems to dominate the Commission’s work on brain drain, the
interviews revealed that these assumptions were increasingly being questioned by people
both inside and outside the Commission. Several interviewees within DG Employment
mentioned that there were two schools of thought, or that the service was ‘walking on two
different legs’: that of mobility and cohesion.18 Mobility proceeds from the assumption that
convergence will happen automatically and labor movements are a win-win; but cohesion
policy admits that structural differences have to be addressed to ensure those win-win
outcomes. These are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but in the policy imagination and
default mindset of interviewees, work often proceeded from an assumption of one or the other
and overlaps or complementarities between cohesion and mobility work are seldom sought.
The slower-moving Eastern drain provides an opportunity for a productive engagement with
the contradictory logics.
There is a different reason why the framing of brain drain as skills mismatch may be wide
of the mark. The assumption that more or better education or training will help potential
migrants find work in their home countries seems to be contradicted by the statistical
conclusion that most Eastern European migrants are already overqualified for the work they
carry out abroad (Galgóczi, Leschke and Watt, 2009). Increased schooling does tend to help
individuals find better work, but the belief that every labor problem on a societal level can be
18 Interview E3, E4, E11
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solved by increased schooling has been strongly questioned – Grubb and Lazerson (2004)
refer to the blind faith in this idea as the ‘education gospel’. Aside from this, the Skills Agenda,
by emphasizing technical and digital skills, risks missing the potential opportunities in devoting
more attention and resources to emotional labor, an area where robots and algorithms will
struggle to replace human workers (Gershon, 2017).
Did the Eurozone crisis open the space for policy imagination regarding brain drain or close
it down? A fast response required ‘fast’ or ‘hot’ knowledge, with little time to check
assumptions and debate alternatives (Tsingou, 2014; Seabrooke & Tsingou, 2016, 2017). But
the crisis also brought up structural problems of the Eurozone and made them vulnerable to
challenges. On the other hand, the supply-side, employability solution to brain drain, which
emerged during the crisis, is still the dominant approach today. Governance mechanisms to
address the slow-burning aspects of brain drain have not been updated at all. The crisis gave
rise to a number of micro-level tools and policies that are but a drop in the ocean compared
to the larger-scale structural forces driving the slow-moving drain. The Commission should
seize the opportunity to think long-term about the state of labor mobility and brain drain and
avoid the temptation to send political signals, such as couching brain drain within the Skills
Agenda, that are unlikely to do much to impact the larger-scale macroeconomic drivers of
brain drain.
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